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Abstract
The Hong Kong stock market is known to be highly volatile. Professional investors have 
a strong demand for timely information because of the infrequent nature of Hong Kong 
analysts’ interim reports (Cheng et al., 2003). Our paper provides a comprehensive study 
of investor reactions to analysts’ recommendations in the Hong Kong stock market from 
2009 to 2014 under different sentiment scenarios. We find that analysts’ recommendation 
upgrades and downgrades deliver significant information to the Hong Kong stock market. 
However, analysts’ initiation coverages convey little information and bring about limited 
impact to the stock market. In addition, analysts’ upgrades and downgrades result in sig‑
nificant differential price impacts in bullish and the bearish phases.
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1 Introduction
By offering high quality and up‑to‑date investment analyzes and recommendations to indi‑
vidual and institutional clients, brokerage houses and investment banks can charge signifi‑
cant fees for the access to accurate research reports which are of benefit to the custom‑
ers. Beside this, one can expect these investment recommendations to generate transaction 
profits for the brokerage houses as clients will implement the suggested trading strategies 
and therefore buy or sell securities.
Unsurprisingly, the value and performance of analysts’ recommendations are constantly 
subjected to criticisms. A critical problem is the analysts’ constant exposure to potential 
conflicts of interests and hence the possible publication of over‑optimistic stock recom‑
mendations that are not in the best interest of the investor. Michaely and Womack (1999), 
and Agrawal and Chen (2008) point towards this issue within financial institutions and 
suggest that frequent conflicts of interest between the research and the corporate finance 
department may result in analysts’ compromising their recommendations in order to maxi‑
mize their company’s profits. This conflict of interest is especially high and leads to posi‑
tively biased recommendations when they concern existing and potential corporate clients 
(Michaely and Womack 1999, 2005). And Chan et al (2018) find that analysts’ stock own‑
ership induces analysts to bias upwards their target price forecasts. This study empirically 
investigates the relationship between equity performance, stock recommendations and mar‑
ket sentiment in the Hong Kong equity market.
It is not surprising that sell‑side analysts are criticized for having a greater incentive to 
issue buy rather than sell recommendations because the former usually generates greater 
trading volume from clients (Lin and McNichols 1998). Firth et al. (2013) find that ana‑
lysts’ recommendations on a stock are significantly higher if the stock is held by mutual 
fund clients of the analysts’ brokerage firm; however, their study focuses on the relation‑
ship between mutual funds and sell‑side analyst recommendations. Michaely and Womack 
(1999) go even further and show that a positive recommendation issued after a company’s 
IPO may be necessary to increase the likelihood that the institution will be chosen as the 
next offering underwriter. Other studies argue that generally, analysts are more reluctant to 
provide negative outlooks for companies (Jegadeesh and Kim 2006; Michaely and Wom‑
ack 2005; Barber et al. 2001). Aggarwal et al. (2018) document that when forming recom‑
mendations, analysts underestimate the role of the cost of equity.
As a result, the stock recommendations provided by analysts may be of lesser value than 
expected by the clients and might therefore result in unprofitable opportunities for inves‑
tors. More specifically, it is questionable if investors can realize profits (or avoid losses) by 
purchasing upgraded securities (selling downgraded securities). Apart from that, market 
sentiment also plays an important role in the performance of an analyst’s stock recommen‑
dations. Baker and Wurgler (2007) give two definitions of investor sentiment: first as a 
driver of relative demand for speculative investments, and second as the investors’ col‑
lective optimism (or pessimism) about stocks in general. Furthermore, they also find that 
stock prices are subject not only to fundamental factors but also to market sentiment.
It is therefore understandable that analysts might consider current market sentiments 
when conducting their analysis and making recommendations. When issuing stock rat‑
ings based on the comparison between the firm’s expected future stock price and the firm’s 
current stock price, analysts will consider both the fundamental underlying factors, such 
as earnings, assets and liabilities, as well as investor sentiment such as past stock returns 
(Brown and Cliff 2004); the same applies when making recommendations (Bagnoli et al. 
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2009). In a more recent study, Li et  al. (2015) show that analysts could facilitate price 
discovery to corporate news by issuing trending and contrarian revisions. Even though 
their study applies intraday data in the US, Li et al. (2015) do not consider if the market 
environment (such as bullish and bearish conditions) affect price discovery and reversal of 
recommendations.
As stated above, this study addresses the shortcomings of previous research and 
explores the empirical relationship between equity performance, stock recommendations 
and market sentiment between January 2009 and May 2014 in the Hong Kong equity mar‑
ket. The Hang Seng Index, Hong Kong’s major stock index, is known to be highly volatile 
which makes professional investors eager to obtain more timely information on corporate 
earnings. However, Hong Kong analysts tend to make drastic revisions since their interim 
reports are not frequent enough compared to the quarterly reports generated by US ana‑
lysts with richer information (Cheng et al. 2003). Therefore, analyzing the effect of stock 
recommendations on equity prices based on Hong Kong equity market can provide a help‑
ful environment to understand and seek for the answers the investors may have about the 
analyst recommendation effects. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK) is Asia’s third 
largest stock exchange in terms of market capitalization and is placed seventh largest in 
the world; it is therefore of great significance to investors. SEHK operates two markets on 
which companies may choose to list their shares: the Main Board and the Growth Enter‑
prise Market (GEM). The Hang Seng Index (HSI) is widely regarded as the market bench‑
mark monitoring daily movements of the largest companies listed on the Hong Kong stock 
market and is the main indicator of the overall market performance in Hong Kong. The HSI 
is a free float‑adjusted market capitalization‑weighted stock market index and comprises 
the 50 major constituent stocks, therefore including 60% of the total market share of the 
Hong Kong Stocks Exchange (Bloomberg.com). By considering the market environment, 
we specifically test whether stock recommendation upgrades and downgrades would gen‑
erate higher and lower profits, respectively under the given market sentiment. Answering 
these questions is important for decision makers in order to understand if the performance 
of potentially biased recommendations might be affected by short‑term market atmosphere. 
Previous studies ignore these crucial considerations allowing us to fill a gap and provide 
vital insights into Asia’s third largest stock exchange in terms of market capitalization.
This study examines the short‑term impact of stock recommendations on the 26 larg‑
est constituent weighted stocks of the Hong Kong stock market, representing together 
a market capitalization of more than three trillion US Dollars. Market conditions of the 
global financial context affect investors’ confidence and the quality of their recommenda‑
tions; we therefore argue that analysts factor market sentiment into their forecasts and issue 
over‑optimistic and/or over‑pessimistic stock recommendations during different periods. 
In more bullish periods, analysts and investors may be over‑optimistic about the future of 
a company, hence issuing buy recommendations leading to higher short‑term returns as 
investors are more inclined to purchase the given security.
We investigate the short‑term impact of those recommendations in bullish and bear‑
ish phases1 by bootstrapping the stock market data and evaluating whether the analysts’ 
1 The bullish phase is taken from March 9, 2009 to November 8, 2010 which shows continuous decrease in 
GDP growth, while the bearish phase is runs from November 9, 2010 to January 1, 2012 showing continu‑
ous increase in GDP growth in Hong Kong. Studies have evidenced the existence of a strong correlation 
between output growth and stock returns in emerging and advanced economies. See Rangvid (2006) and 
Mauro (2003).
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recommendations affect the overall market sentiment under different market conditions. 
We gauge investor confidence firstly by relying on surveys reflecting what investors and 
key actors in the Hong Kong stock market believe, and second, by considering the actual 
state of the economy, by examining daily news coverages. With this data in hand, two sub‑
periods are generated: a bullish phase and a bearish phase. Papakroni (2018) finds strong 
evidence that the impact of analyst forecast dispersion is more pronounced in the group of 
stocks that receive the least favorable recommendations in each period.
This study makes significant contributions to the literature on recommendations of stock 
analysts. First, our study investigates whether variations in the market conditions affect the 
recommendations issued by analysts. This is done by investigating the performance of stock 
recommendations through different periods of time, considering bull and bear markets, 
in order to determine whether analysts’ recommendations are influenced by stock market 
atmosphere. If indeed analyst recommendations are influenced by market sentiment, stock 
forecasts will be cyclical and correlated with the economic climate. Previous studies, such 
as Jegadeesh and Kim (2006), Bagnoli et al (2009) and Womack (1996) ignore this issue, 
making their conclusions less comparable to our work. A second contribution is that our 
study examines all major recommendations by analysts, including downgrades, upgrades, 
and initiations to sell or to buy respectively. Most related studies are narrow and focus 
on specific recommendations, such as upgrade and downgrade (Ang et  al. 1998); initia‑
tions of coverage (Irvine 2003); and secondhand analyst recommendations (Chan and Fong 
1996). A third contribution is the robustness of our paper which analyzes the period before 
and after a recommendation. Previous studies focus on posterior effects of analysts’ recom‑
mendation (Moshirian et  al 2009) and pay little attention to the market situation before 
the recommendation. Although Petaibanlue et  al. (2015) examine the period before the 
recommendations; they only do it based on impact on IFRS adoption. Our study makes 
a vital contribution to market participants and researchers by analyzing both the pre and 
post recommendation period and use standardized abnormal returns. Finally, and perhaps 
the most original contribution stems from the fact that ours is the first study to examine the 
conditional effect of market sentiment on the analysts’ recommendations with and without 
look‑ahead biases. We extend this line of research by taking into consideration the effect of 
the look ahead bias (hindsight bias) and provide an approximation for the error associated 
by this look ahead bias.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 presents the relevant literature on 
the performance and value of stock recommendations in different time frames and target 
markets. Section 3 illustrates the methodology of this study while Sect. 4 describes the data 
and the sample selection. Section 5 presents and analyzes the major empirical results with 
robustness tests. Then Sect. 6 concludes.
2  Literature review
The extant literature on analysts’ recommendations related to investment information has 
developed in various aspects. Based on the comprehensive stock recommendations on U.S. 
stocks provided by fourteen major U.S. brokerage firms, Womack (1996) finds that the 
new added‑to‑sell recommendations are less frequent but more predictive than new added‑
to‑buy recommendations. In other words, the analysts tend to perceive substantial risk in 
issuing sell recommendations since these are less frequent, more visible and contain more 
information compared to buy recommendations (Pratt 1993). Other recent studies (He et al 
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2020; Arif and De George 2020) have shown that analyst coverage has a negative impact 
on tax risk; and that loss sensitive investors are unable to completely eliminate the infor‑
mation loss arising from infrequent financial reporting which can affect the valuation of 
firms and the quality of financial markets. Consequently, analysts tend to herd more when 
the firm has negative media sentiment (Frijns and Huynh 2018). Barber et al. (2001) find 
results consistent with Womack (1996) and show that investors can generate significant 
positive (negative) abnormal returns by following analyst’ upgrades (downgrades) on secu‑
rities, though abnormal loss provision generally reduces analyst coverage particularly in 
the banking sector (Hong et al 2020). Loh (2010) examines why the information conveyed 
by stock recommendations doesn’t get fully incorporated in the stock price when recom‑
mendations are released. He finds that the investor inattention contributes to a larger stock 
recommendation drift and that the subsequent drift reflects investors’ gradual realization of 
the true stock price implied by the published recommendation.
Green (2006), Chen and Cheng (2006) and Kadan et  al. (2018) find that market par‑
ticipants with early access to recommendation information tend to earn higher profits than 
their peers without early access. Green (2006) argues that the trading profits increase with 
early access to both buy and sell recommendations while the latter shows larger increase 
by selling short following downgrades. Chen and Cheng (2006) maintain that stock rec‑
ommendations contain valuable information and institutional investors under soft dollar 
arrangements can have timely access to these recommendations which contribute to their 
superior performance. Kadan et al. (2018) find that the early‑informed news‑driven insti‑
tutions tend to accumulate wealth transferred from program traders who have less early 
information access advantages. Francis and Soffer (2006) find that both earnings fore‑
cast revisions and stock recommendations are significantly related to the market reac‑
tions to analysts’ reports and neither of these signals about the share values subsumes the 
other. According to Lee et al. (2018), however, the firms voluntarily issuing CSR‑related 
reports tend to have richer information environment which reduces the value of analyst’s 
recommendations.
Investor sentiment serves as another important factor when analyzing stock recommen‑
dations. Bagnoli et  al. (2009) and Corredor et  al. (2013) find that analysts tend to issue 
more favorable stock recommendations when recent or future investor sentiment are opti‑
mistic. Bagnoli et  al. (2009) also show that investor sentiment sensitive analysts tend to 
issue relatively less profitable stock recommendations while analysts who issue investor 
sentiment sensitive stocks offer more profitable recommendations than their peers. Chen 
and Matsumoto (2006) find that analysts issuing more favorable recommendations expe‑
rience a greater increase in their relative forecast accuracy compared with analysts with 
less favorable recommendations. Furthermore, Barber et al. (2010) argue that the abnormal 
stock returns are the greatest conditional on the ratings change to buy and strong buy rec‑
ommendations than to holds, sells and strong sells. Conditional on the ratings level, they 
find upgrades earn the highest returns and downgrades the lowest.
Evidence of impact from stock recommendations outside the US market has also been 
established. Focusing on the United Kingdom, Ryan and Taffler (2006) find that the price 
reaction in the UK market was similar to that of the US market in which the price impact 
of new sell recommendations was greater than that of new buy recommendations (Barber 
et al. 2007) but less susceptible to potential conflicts of interest than in the US. They find 
that the abnormal returns are associated with a firm’s information environment and analyst 
incentives.
Offering insights into an Asian country, Ang et al. (1998) evaluate the ability of four 
individual anonymous brokerage houses in Singapore to make buy recommendations from 
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1990 to 1992. They find that out of the four brokerage houses under research, only the 
buy recommendations of one firm had significant impact on the date of the recommenda‑
tions. Surprisingly, by accounting for the effect of transactions costs, all positive abnor‑
mal returns were eliminated; implying that investors can’t earn positive abnormal return in 
excess of transactions costs by following the brokerage analyst’s recommendations.
Chan and Fong (1996) focus on whether the publication of an individual investors’ sen‑
timent survey in Securities Firms’ Investment Analysis column (SFIA) of the Hong Kong 
Economic Journal (HKEJ) newspaper temporarily affects stock returns in the Hong Kong 
stock market. They suggest that the reporting of the recommendations in SFIA does induce 
trading, and there is also a heavy trading in the day just before the publication of SFIA. 
However, their study only focuses on the predictive ability for stock returns. Later, Chan 
and Fong (2004) investigate how stock prices are temporarily affected by SFIA. They find 
that the publication does not really predict the coming week’s return on large, medium, or 
small stocks while the daily closing prices for medium and small stocks are affected but not 
the large stocks. However, the SFIA publishes only the second‑hand analysts’ recommen‑
dations not the first‑hand ones which are usually provided to securities firms’ clients. Our 
paper uses the J.P. Morgan Hong Kong Investor Confidence Index, a quarterly investors’ 
sentiment index, and use the top 26 major stocks listed in the Hang Seng index to analyze 
the impact of analysts’ recommendations on the Hong Kong stock market. We then inves‑
tigate the investors’ reactions to analysts’ recommendations based on investment sentiment 
with conditional probability applications and consider the effect of look‑ahead bias.
3  Methodology
In order to analyze the performance of stock recommendations, we measure the abnormal 
return of the stocks linked to the release of recommendation upgrades or downgrades ini‑
tiations (see Liu et al. 1990). The abnormal return for security i on event day t is defined as:
where Ri,t is the daily total return (including dividends) of security i for day t and Rm,t is the 
daily total return (including dividends) of the benchmark index in the Hong Kong market: 
the Hang Seng index.
In addition, the normal return of security i is calculated, while ̂i and ̂i are the ordinary 
least square (OLS) estimates for the model parameters of security i obtained by regress‑
ing the total return of security i against the total return of the index. Moreover, the mar‑
ket model is estimated over the observations for 100  days,2 while t = 0 is the release of 
the stock recommendation upgrades or downgrades initiations obtained from Bloomberg. 
Since the abnormal return of each security is defined, the average daily abnormal return of 
each day t within the event window, AAR t, is calculated as:
(1)ARi,t = Ri,t − (̂i + ̂i × Rm,t)
2 We also checked for robustness using two approaches. We used an estimation window that was 25% 
shorter than 100 days and found that our results for both the Fama and French 3‑factor model and Market 
Model remained qualitatively the same. Second, we re‑estimated our results using a market‑adjusted returns 
model, as it does not involve any estimation period at all. Again, our results were very similar to our Fama 
and French 3‑factor results.
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where t =  − 5, − 4, − 3 ⋯ , 0,⋯ 8, 9, 10.
The average cumulative daily abnormal return between t = t1 and t = t2, defined as 
ACARt1,t2 , is calculated as:
We test the statistical significance of the abnormal return for security i on day t by 
standardizing the returns as:
where Si is the residual standard deviation for stock i by using the estimation of the market 
model from t =  − 5 to t = 10.
The average standardized daily abnormal return for each day of the event window 
(t =  − 5, − 4, − 3 ⋯ , 0,⋯ 8, 9, 10), ASARt , is calculated by averaging the SARi,t of all 
securities:
where t =  − 5, − 4, − 3 ⋯ , 0,⋯ 8, 9, 10.
Furthermore, the t‑statistics of average abnormal return for each date t is computed by:
We apply the 2‑tailed t‑statistics test to determine whether or not the abnormal return 
and the cumulative return are statistically significant for each day t. Specifically, if the t‑sta‑
tistics calculated lie outside the range of the distribution depending on a particular level of 
statistical significance (e.g. 5% significance level), then we should reject the hypothesis 
that the return is equal to 0 (i.e. the return is statistically significant).
There are other recent studies of analyst recommendations that also used a single factor 
model to estimate abnormal returns (see Amiram et al. 2016; Du et al. 2017; Kudryavtsev 
2019; Kim et  al. 2019). But, in a later section of our paper, we also estimate abnormal 
returns using the Fama & French 3‑factor model (Eq.  (7)) which has been used in some 
papers in the area (e.g., Rubanov and Nnadi 2018; Su et al. 2019; Li et al. 2020).
Rf ,t is the risk‑free rate, ̂i is the intercept and ̂i is the coefficient estimate of the 
excess market return 
(
Rm,t − Rf ,t
)
.ŝp and ĥp are the coefficients for the difference in our 
total sample Hong Kong stock portfolio p between small and big stocks (SMBt) and 
high and low book‑to‑market stocks (HMLt) at time t, respectively. We produce the size 
(SMBt) and book‑to‑market equity (HMLt) factors as follows. We sort our sample stocks 
into two size groups based on the median market capitalization (i.e., median size), 




















(6)T − statt = ASARt × N
1
2
(7)ARi,t = Ri,t − (Rf ,t + ̂i + ̂i
(
Rm,t − Rf ,t
)
+ ŝpSMBt + ĥpHMLt)
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stocks into three groups of book‑to‑market equity values based on the thresholds for 
the bottom 30 percent (L, for “low”), middle 40 percent (M, for “medium”) and top 30 
percent (H, for “high”). SMBt is the difference between the average returns on the three 
small stock portfolios (S/L, S/M and S/H) and the average returns on the three big stock 
portfolios (B/L, B/M and B/H) at time t. HMLt is the difference between the average 
returns on the two high book‑to‑market equity portfolios (S/H and B/H) and the two 
low book‑to‑market equity portfolios (S/L and B/L) at time t. We repeat the steps from 
Eqs. (2) to (6) using our Eq. (7) instead of (1) to perform our event study.
Finally, complementary to the above analysis, we study the impact of the previous 
quarter’s market sentiment when an analyst makes an ‘upgrade’, ‘downgrade’ or a ‘hold’ 
recommendation by employing a conditional probability model based on a binomial 
framework. In particular, we seek to find out what would be the conditional probability 
of an upgrade/hold/downgrade of a given stock, if the investor sentiment is positive/
negative in the last quarter. We denote reci,t as the analyst recommendation i = {upgrade, 
downgrade, hold} at time t. senj,t as the investor sentiment j = {positive, negative} at 
time t. Then we express these in terms of probabilities, and use the cumulative data 
from one quarter to the next: The analyst recommendation probability is the cumulative 
recommendations from one quarter to the next, for example as from time s to time t. 
Similarly, the investor sentiment probability is the change in investor sentiment indices 
from one quarter to the next, also from time s to time t. (Please refer Panel D of Table 8 
for a detailed methodology of the estimation). This investment sentiment probability 
is the normalized percentage change in investor sentiment index relative to the aver‑
age sentiment. We express the combined effect between these analyst recommendation 
reci,t and investor sentiment senj,t in the following conditional form. We use the expected 
(i.e., average) value form for this as below.
We then find the expected stock return from the analyst’s recommendation conditional 
on the investor sentiment by multiplying Eq. (8) by the corresponding stock return ( rt).
For example, when investigating an analyst upgrade recommendation with positive 
investors sentiment at time t = 2, the following Eq. (10) expresses this case.
Then the corresponding expected stock return can be calculated by multiplying Eq. (10) 
by the stock return at time t = 2.
However, this analysis in this current from suffers from a look‑ahead bias as the inves‑
tor sentiment in the current quarter would only be available in the following quarter. To 
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the previous quarters sentiment value (which is a known figure in the current quarter) thus 
implicitly assuming the investor sentiment process is a pure martingale.3
4  Data and sample selection
In the financial market, stock recommendations issued by different brokerage houses and 
investment firms may take different forms. Generally, based on their independent analysis 
and predictions on the covered firms and companies, sell‑side analysts would usually issue 
one of the following statements: 1. strong buy; 2. buy; 3. hold/neutral; 4. sell and 5. strong 
sell.4
Our sample comprises 50 actively traded constituent stocks in the Hong Kong stock 
market. The Hang Seng Index is the free‑adjusted market capitalization‑weighted stock 
market index in Hong Kong which serves as the main indicator of the overall market per‑
formance of the local stock market. Although the constituent stocks of the index have been 
regularly reclassified, our analysis focuses on the top 26 major stocks in terms of index 
weighting which covers more than 80% of market capitalization of the Hang Seng Index.
The sample period is defined as the period between the January 1, 2009 and the May 1, 
2014 when the market experienced significant waves in trading. All sample recommenda‑
tions of those 26 stocks are selected using Bloomberg. Companies that are listed within 
the sample period are considered to be stocks that have proven to be actively traded with 
significant market capitalization and turnover. In addition, all stocks have been covered by 
at least one analyst throughout the whole sample period. Delisted firms are excluded from 
the sample.
For those 26 target stocks, a total of 1751 recommendations from 402 analysts have 
been obtained within the sample period, consisting of 884 recommendation upgrades and 
Table 1  Total upgrades and downgrades of stock recommendations on the 26 target stocks from sell‑side 
analysts between the 01‑01‑2009 and the 05‑01‑2014
Total upgrade Total downgrade Total
Total recommendations of the 26 stocks 884 867 1751
Year of sample period Upgrade Downgrade Total
01/01/2009–12/31/2009 215 193 408
01/01/2010–12/31/2010 134 133 267
01/01/2011–12/31/2011 134 139 273
01/01/2012–12/31/2012 182 221 403
01/01/2013–12/31/2013 153 142 295
01/01/2014–05/01/2014 66 39 105
Total recommendation excluded (29) (26) (55)
Total 855 841 1696
3 The stochastic process X = {Xt} t ≥ 0 is called a martingale, if (1) E(|Xt |) < ∞ for all t ≥ 0; and (2) E(Xt 
|Xs) = Xs for all t ≥ s ≥ 0.
4 The classification is similar to the records of the five − point scale classification of the First Call database 
(see Barber et al. 2007).
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867 recommendation downgrades. Details of the data are shown in Table 1. However, in 
order to ensure consistency in the comparison of the effects of different stock recommenda‑
tions, we exclude all recommendations that were released on weekends or holidays.
To derive the conditional probability statements based on the investor sentiment we 
use the J.P. Morgan Hong Kong Investor Confidence Index which is a survey‑based index 
reflecting the investors’ sentiment over the next six months. Over 500 investors aged 
between 30 and 60 participate in the survey and have a minimum of HK$100,000 in liquid 
assets and at least 5 years of continuous investment experience.
The J.P. Morgan Investor Confidence Index (JPMICI) score is derived by asking survey 
respondents six questions to assess the confidence of investors about (Q1) the Hang Seng 
Index, (Q2) HK economic environment, (Q3) HK investment environment and sentiment, 
(Q4) global economic environment, (Q5) the possibility of personal asset appreciation, 
and (Q6) the possibility of increasing their investment. These six questions form the sub‑
indices of the J.P. Morgan Investor Confidence Index. The index and all sub‑indices have 
a range between 0 and 200. A number greater than 100 represents a positive outlook and 
vice versa. The Index is designed to reflect local investor sentiment towards the Hong Kong 
market over the next 6 months following its last date of publication. It is fair to assume that 
the JPMICI index is a representation of investor confidence in the HK market. As such, the 
semi‑annual changes of the index value will reflect the perceived changes in investor senti‑
ment. We have attached associated probability values of these changes in order to facili‑
tate a richer analysis using a Bayesian framework. Assessing changes through probabil‑
ity values within a Bayesian framework has been practiced in the finance literature before 
(see Beaver 1966, 1968). We are certainly not the first to work with sentiment indices (see 
Huang et  al. 2015; Lee et  al. 2002, where the authors use the Baker and Wurgler 2006 
Index). However, the Baker and Wurgler (2006) Index does not cover Hong Kong during 
our period of interest, so we opted to use the JPMICI Index.
5  Empirical results
5.1  Recommendation upgrades
Sell‑side analysts upgrade their covered stocks when they predict that the stock prices are 
going to rise in the short‑run and/or medium‑run, which may result in significant changes 
in stock prices. Table 2 presents the results of the average abnormal returns (AAR ) for each 
day (from t =  − 5 through t =  + 10) with the event day occurring at t = 0. The findings show 
that the average abnormal returns of the stocks from 1 day before through 2 days after the 
analysts’ upgrades (t =  − 1 to t =  + 2) become positive and are highly statistically signifi‑
cant at the 1% level. The abnormal return reaches a maximum of 0.41% on the release day 
of the recommendation upgrade.
In addition, the statistically significant positive abnormal return is sustained for 3 days 
after the release day and the abnormal return remains at 0.9%. However, from day 4 
onwards the AAR becomes statistically insignificant5 as all new information has been incor‑
porated. The empirical results show that recommendation upgrades by analysts deliver 
5 In their results, Chan and Fong (1996) observed that the AR remained insignificant from day 2 through 
day 25.
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substantial information to market participants in the Hong Kong market and have positive 
impact on the stocks with the effects lasting for a few days. Yet, the returns are indeed very 
small: AAR 0 to AAR 10 adds up to just under 1% and investors are not likely to gain profits 
after accounting for transaction costs. These results are consistent with Liu et al. (1990), 
but the overall effects seem to be smaller in this study.
Also, similar to the observation of Liu et al. (1990), our results in the table show that 
the abnormal returns on the day before the release of security upgrades (0.1528%) are posi‑
tive and statistically significant, although small. This may be due to the leakage of pri‑
vate information from analysts to clients. This implies that the recommendation upgrades 
deliver information that is swiftly reflected in stock prices within a short period of time, 
even if investors are unable to make trading profits after accounting for transaction costs.
5.2  Recommendation downgrades
Table 3 shows the results of the average abnormal returns (AAR ) for each day (from t =  − 5 
through t =  + 10) surrounding recommendation downgrades (t = 0). Although the AARs 
become negative from the day before the announcement onwards, they only start becoming 
statistically significant on the announcement day. In other words, no evidence of significant 
information leakage or pre‑trading is found based on the sample considered. Our finding 
is somewhat different to Liu et al. (1990) who show that the AARs just preceding the sell 
recommendations were significantly negative due to advance trading by investors based on 
speculation, or prior knowledge about the contents of the financial column.
Table 2  Average abnormal 
returns for recommendation 
upgrades surrounding the day of 
release
The data window runs from January 1, 2009 to May 1, 2014 (based on 
100 days estimation period)
*Significant at the 10% level, 2‑tailed test
**Significant at the 5% level, 2‑tailed test
***Significant at the 1% level, 2‑tailed test
Event day Average AR (%) t‑statistics for 
average AR
− 5 − 0.0403 − 0.8160
− 4 − 0.0130 − 0.6068
− 3 − 0.0907 − 1.6468*
− 2 − 0.0183 − 0.6268





4 − 0.0224 − 0.0189
5 0.0441 1.1364
6 − 0.0124 − 0.1199
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The AAR reaches a minimum of − 0.57% on the release day of recommendation down‑
grades and is highly significant. On the next day (t = 1), the AARs remain negative at 
about − 0.42% and significant at the 1% level. The returns remain negative from day 3 
through day 10 but are statistically significant only on day 3 (at the 5% level) and day 8 
(at the 10% level). AAR 0 to AAR 10 adds up to − 1.535%. These results show that analysts’ 
downgrades have a relatively larger impact on the stock prices surrounding the announce‑
ment day, suggesting that downgrades deliver more significant information to the stock 
market than upgrades. Also, negative information seems to require relatively less time 
(about 2 days) to be incorporated and reflected in the stock price (Liu et al. 1990). And 
the market quickly reflects the information on the stock prices without price reversal in the 
short run (Chan and Fong 1996).
5.3  Initiation of coverage‑buy
Analysts would initiate stock coverage for many reasons at different time points and issue 
positive (e.g. buy; outperform; outweigh etc.) or negative (sell; strong sell; underperform) 
recommendations along with the new coverage. We analyze the whole sample period and 
determine their abnormal impact on the stock market.
An initiation of coverage is the first research report produced by a stock analyst about 
a particular stock. Wang (2020) provides evidence that analysts gather and produce addi‑
tional private information to the market and that their information reduces investors’ uncer‑
tainty toward upcoming earnings announcements. Brokerage houses or investment bank 
Table 3  Average abnormal 
returns for recommendation 
downgrades surrounding the day 
of release
Data window runs from January 1, 2009 to May 1, 2014 (based on 
100 days estimation period)
*Significant at the 10% level, 2‑tailed test
**Significant at the 5% level, 2‑tailed test
***Significant at the 1% level, 2‑tailed test
Event day Average AR (%) t‑statistics for average AR
− 5 0.0416 0.5329
− 4 0.0927 1.6429
− 3 0.0797 1.5253
− 2 0.0633 0.6679
− 1 − 0.0233 − 0.9508
0 − 0.5718 − 14.7279***
1 − 0.4166 − 10.5787***
2 − 0.1895 − 3.4653***
3 − 0.0586 − 1.1073
4 − 0.1155 − 1.0855
5 0.0301 1.2268
6 − 0.0166 − 0.8427
7 − 0.0148 − 1.0400
8 − 0.1162 − 1.6677*
9 − 0.0485 − 0.5739
10 − 0.0170 0.2310
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analysts cover new stocks for various reasons. For instance, they may believe that the 
new coverage can generate trading revenues in the security. Also, the corporate finance 
departments of the brokerage houses may ask for stock coverage as they believe these will 
encourage the underwriting business (Irvine 2003). Moreover, in some cases, analysts will 
cover new stocks for their important clients when they realize that the clients have sub‑
stantial holdings in some companies. Therefore, the analysts provide support and a flow of 
information to their clients (Irvine 2003).
There are 449 New Buy Initiations6 issued by analysts for the 26 constituent stocks of 
the Hang Seng Index within the sample period. Table 4 presents the results of the average 
abnormal returns (AAR ) for each day (from t =  − 5 through t =  + 10) around the release day 
of a New Buy Initiation (t = 0) with the corresponding t‑statistics. Interestingly, the impact 
of New Buy initiations on stock prices is different from that of recommendation upgrades. 
The results show that only on the day prior to the announcement event, the AAR is slightly 
positive (0.137%) and statistically significant (t‑statistic of 2.29). During the release day, 
the AAR 0 is at 0.0822% and insignificant. The AAR remains insignificant except for the 
fourth and seventh day after the announcement.
In general, the announcement of new buy coverage has insignificant impact on the 
stock price around the release day (t = 0). This implies that the announcement of new buy 
Table 4  Average abnormal 
returns for new buy coverage 
initiations surrounding the day 
of release
Data window runs from January 1, 2009 to May 1, 2014 (based on 
100 days estimation period)
*Significant at the 10% level, 2‑tailed test
**Significant at the 5% level, 2‑tailed test
***Significant at the 1% level, 2‑tailed test
Event day Average AR (%) t‑statistics for 
average AR
− 5 0.0695 1.7979*
− 4 − 0.0659 − 0.5538
− 3 0.0628 1.8540*
− 2 0.1095 1.1913
− 1 0.1368 2.2892**
0 0.0822 1.3423
1 − 0.0730 − 0.9238
2 0.0395 1.6234
3 0.0006 0.3832
4 − 0.1890 − 3.1250***
5 0.0401 0.4892
6 − 0.0942 − 1.3055
7 − 0.1108 − 1.6990*
8 − 0.0712 − 0.3085
9 − 0.0597 − 0.1103
10 0.0130 0.6333
6 Buy recommendations include all positive ratings issued by analysts including long term buy, accumu‑
late, strong buy, outperform and overweight. Six recommendations are excluded as they were issued on 
non‑trading days such as holidays and/or weekends.
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coverage by sell‑side analysts delivers relatively insignificant information, while investors 
are not able to gain any significant abnormal return by trading the covered stock around 
the announcement day. These results suggest that the information content of analysts’ new 
buy coverage initiations is not as important as recommendations upgrades since the return 
of recommendation upgrades on the event day was 0.41% (and significant at the 1% level) 
compared to an insignificant figure of 0.082% for new buy coverage.
5.4  Initiation of coverage‑sell
Our sample contains 55 new sell initiations issued by analysts for the 26 constituent stocks 
of the Hang Seng Index within the sample period. The number of new sell initiations is 
therefore much lower than the 449 new buy initiations in our sample; this distribution con‑
forms to the hypothesis that analysts are more likely to start covering equities which they 
view favorably. This is consistent with the observations of Irvine (2003): analysts’ initia‑
tions are more likely to be strong buy/buy and less likely to be hold/sell. By initiating cov‑
erage, analysts can then offer compelling stories about the covered stocks’ fundamental 
values, which will further generate trading in the securities.
Like the previous tables, Table 5 shows the average abnormal returns (AARs) of each 
day (from t =  − 5 through t =  + 10) surrounding the release day of New Sell initiations 
(t = 0). Interestingly, the abnormal returns before the announcement day are statistically 
insignificant. On the announcement day itself, the AAR is insignificant though nega‑
tive (− 0.198%). However, on the first day after the announcement, the negative AAR 
Table 5  Average abnormal 
returns for new sell coverage 
initiations surrounding the day 
of release
Data window runs from January 1, 2009 to May 1, 2014 (based on 
100 days estimation period)
*Significant at the 10% level, 2‑tailed test
**Significant at the 5% level, 2‑tailed test
***Significant at the 1% level, 2‑tailed test
Event day Average AR (%) t‑statistics for 
average AR
− 5 0.224 0.784
− 4 0.161 0.016
− 3 0.264 0.788
− 2 0.133 − 0.592
− 1 − 0.104 − 0.724
0 − 0.198 − 0.464
1 − 0.304 − 1.739*
2 − 0.293 − 0.808
3 − 0.010 − 0.489
4 0.077 − 0.367
5 − 0.171 0.653
6 0.316 0.099
7 0.076 − 0.437
8 0.132 1.323
9 − 0.345 − 1.393
10 − 0.528 − 1.595
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(− 0.304%) becomes statistically significant at the 10% significance level. The AARs for 
the following days remain insignificant. These results are similar to Irvine (2003), who 
found that the 2‑day abnormal return around sell initiations was − 0.32% and statisti‑
cally insignificant.
Although anecdotal evidence suggests that new sell initiations may result in signifi‑
cantly negative abnormal returns since analysts do not view the stocks favorably, the 
AARs presented in Table 5 indicate that, as analysts announce new sell initiations, the 
stock prices do not drop significantly on the announcement day as predicted by the ana‑
lysts. In other words, investors do not consider new sell initiations as containing sig‑
nificantly unfavorable new information content; and the initiations do not result in sub‑
stantial negative abnormal returns on the announcement day. The AARs are significantly 
negative only on the day after the announcement (t = 1) while the AARs remain insignifi‑
cant thereafter, although the insignificance of the abnormal returns may be partly due to 
the relatively small sample size for new sell initiations (Irvine 2003).
Our findings have indicated that recommendation upgrades and downgrades as well 
as new coverage initiations of sell‑side analysts have differential impacts on the Hong 
Kong stock market. The results reveal that analysts’ recommendations convey substan‑
tial information to investors and result in significant abnormal returns consistent with 
the predictions of the analysts surrounding the announcement day. On the other hand, 
the market does not consider new coverage initiations as significant information‑the ini‑
tiations do not result in substantial positive or negative abnormal returns surrounding 
the announcement day.
5.5  Upgrades and downgrades during bullish and bearish phases
It is unlikely that the impact of analysts’ recommendations will be identical when the 
overall market is bullish as against bearish, since analysts may be highly influenced by 
the overall market conditions when making recommendation upgrades and downgrades. 
In particular, in the bullish period when investors expect security prices to rise in gen‑
eral and are optimistic about the future of the market, analysts may be more prone to 
upgrade securities considering the overall market sentiment. Yet, the recommendation 
may not be justified by the analysts’ earnings forecast for the covered firms (Bagnoli 
et al. 2009). On the other hand, in bearish periods when market sentiment is pessimistic, 
analysts may consider that most stocks are declining and factor in the general pessimis‑
tic sentiment into their stock analysis. As a result, one might expect the price impact of 
stock upgrades and downgrades to vary in different time phases. Therefore, to determine 
whether our earlier results for upgrades and downgrades are influenced by market con‑
ditions, we investigate the price impacts of recommendation upgrades and downgrades 
in bullish and bearish markets.
The bullish period ran from March 9, 2009 to November 8, 2010, the latter being 
the date of the Hong Kong stock market peak, while the bearish period commenced on 
November 9, 2010 and ended on January 1, 2012. Throughout the above bullish and 
bearish sample periods, there are 446 recommendation upgrades (not including 21 that 
are excluded as they were issued on non‑trading days such as holidays and/or weekends) 
and 428 downgrades in total. There are 292 recommendation upgrades and 267 recom‑
mendation downgrades within the bullish phase, against 154 recommendation upgrades 
and 161 recommendation downgrades within the bearish phase.
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5.5.1  Impact of recommendation upgrades during the bullish and bearish phases
The second and fourth columns of Table 6 present the Average Abnormal Returns (AAR ) 
based on MM residuals for recommendation upgrades during the bullish and bearish phases. 
Like previous results, recommendation upgrades produce significantly positive returns on 
the announcement day (t = 0) in both the bullish and the bearish phases. Yet, the AAR 0 dur‑
ing the bullish phase (0.496%) is slightly higher than that during the bearish phase (0.228%). 
In other words, in a bullish environment, analyst’s upgrades result in higher abnormal 
returns on the announcement day perhaps because of the prevailing optimistic environment. 
In a bearish environment however, investors may be less likely to purchase stocks at the first 
sight of the information because the overall market sentiment is pessimistic, resulting in 
relatively lower abnormal returns.
Moreover, the AARs on the first day in both phases are still significantly positive, which 
suggests that the high demand in upgraded stocks still exists on the day after the announce‑
ment. However, the AARs remain significantly positive (up until day 4) only during the 
bearish phase, but not in the bullish phase in which the information is quickly reflected in 
the security prices and AAR becomes insignificant from day 2 onwards. Therefore, inves‑
tors in a bearish environment may require more time to reflect on the upgrades and observe 
market movements before taking action to purchase the upgraded stocks, such that the 
resulting positive price effects are staggered for a few days after the stock upgrades. In 
fact, when one compares the CAR plots based on MM residuals for both bullish and bearish 
phases (see Fig. 1), it becomes even more clear that the positive price impact for upgrades 
Table 6  Average abnormal returns (AARs) of recommendation upgrades surrounding the release day dur‑
ing the bullish (03‑09‑2009 ~ 11‑08‑2010) and the bearish (11‑09‑2010 ~ 01‑01‑2012) phases
t‑stats in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Event day Bullish Bearish
MM 3‑Factor MM 3‑Factor
Average AR (%) Average AR (%) Average AR (%) Average AR (%)
− 5 − 0.052 (− 0.703) − 0.044 (− 0.332) − 0.078 (− 0.835) − 0.135 (− 1.39)
− 4 0.098 (0.715) 0.052 (0.559) − 0.095 (− 0.913) − 0.116 (− 0.899)
− 3 − 0.135 (− 1.607) 0.022 (0.226) − 0.062 (0.000) − 0.069 (− 0.536)
− 2 0.033 (0.143) 0.032 (0.337) − 0.274** (− 2.275) − 0.166 (− 1.26)
− 1 0.061* (0.179) 0.057 (0.463) 0.241*** (2.762) 0.069 (0.497)
0 0.496*** (5.022) 0.31** (2.476) 0.228** (2.161) 0.02 (0.133)
1 0.271** (2.554) 0.178* (1.673) 0.344*** (3.460) 0.175 (1.093)
2 0.012 (0.406) 0.029 (0.353) 0.22* (1.736) 0.179 (1.398)
3 − 0.01 (− 0.021) − 0.038 (− 0.368) 0.062* (1.814) 0.042 (0.324)
4 − 0.049 (− 0.024) − 0.045 (− 0.44) 0.32* (1.822) 0.324** (2.334)
5 0 (− 0.330) 0.05 (0.521) 0.122 (0.469) 0.001 (0.01)
6 − 0.066 (− 0.880) 0.036 (0.4) − 0.138 (− 0.997) − 0.163 (− 1.064)
7 − 0.195* (− 1.788) − 0.038 (− 0.392) 0.033 (− 0.134) 0.009 (0.068)
8 0.054 (0.212) 0.014 (0.146) − 0.14 (− 0.857) − 0.059 (− 0.411)
9 − 0.095 (− 0.686) − 0.091 (− 1.016) 0.131 (1.578) 0.05 (0.378)
10 0.012 (0.288) 0.137 (1.306) − 0.033 (0.444) − 0.007 (− 0.064)



















































Fig. 1  Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) using market model (MM) during the bullish (03‑09‑
2009 ~ 11‑08‑2010) and the bearish (11‑09‑2010 ~ 01‑01‑2012) phases with upgrades and downgrades sur‑
rounding the release day
Table 7  Average abnormal returns (AARs) of recommendation downgrades surrounding the release day 
during the bullish (03‑09‑2009 ~ 11‑08‑2010) and the bearish (11‑09‑2010 ~ 01‑01‑2012) phases
t‑stats in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Event day Bullish Bearish
MM 3‑Factor MM 3‑Factor
Average AR (%) Average AR (%) Average AR (%) Average AR (%)
− 5 0.155* (1.883) 0.078 (0.195) − 0.078 (− 1.152) − 0.07 (− 0.761)
− 4 − 0.075 (− 0.25) 0.918 (1.322) 0.153 (1.075) 0.129 (1.106)
− 3 0.019 (0.379) 0.276 (0.584) 0.150 (0.894) 0.147 (1.324)
− 2 − 0.084 (− 0.557) − 0.048 (− 0.145) 0.127 (0.151) − 0.001 (− 0.006)
− 1 − 0.115 (− 0.730) − 0.486 (− 1.449) 0.134 (1.446) 0.037 (0.353)
0 − 0.372*** (− 3.500) 0.303 (1.448) − 0.824*** (− 9.303) − 0.553*** (− 3.327)
1 − 0.334*** (− 2.902) − 0.326 (− 0.77) − 0.408*** (− 5.468) − 0.399*** (− 2.961)
2 − 0.289** (− 2.453) − 0.724 (− 1.845) − 0.247*** (− 3.062) − 0.258* (− 1.972)
3 0.001 (0.192) 0.191 (0.455) − 0.069* (− 1.771) − 0.095 (− 0.749)
4 − 0.182* (− 1.749) 0.369 (1.032) 0.124 (0.827) 0.091 (0.723)
5 − 0.011 (− 0.418) 0.902 (1.223) 0.149 (1.572) 0.05 (0.482)
6 − 0.047 (0.244) − 0.245 (− 0.516) − 0.166** (− 2.479) − 0.164 (− 1.494)
7 0.123 (0.842) − 0.831 (− 1.86) − 0.267* (− 1.963) − 0.224* (− 1.893)
8 − 0.322** (− 2.599) − 0.439** (− 2.882) − 0.372*** (− 2.824) − 0.266** (− 2.04)
9 − 0.203 (− 1.480) − 0.166 (− 0.335) 0.098 (1.260) 0.118 (1.062)
10 − 0.025 (0.052) − 0.799** (− 2.828) 0.083 (1.226) − 0.019 (− 0.164)
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is felt immediately after the announcement, with partial reversal of some of the gains as 
one approaches t = 10. On the other hand, in the bearish phase, although there is a smaller 
price impact just after the announcement, the price increases continue as one approaches 
the end of the event window. The price adjustment following the upgrades is more gradual 
in the bearish scenario.
5.5.2  Impact of recommendation downgrades during the bullish and bearish phases
Columns two and four in Table 7 show the Average Abnormal Returns (AAR ) based on 
MM residuals for recommendation downgrades for the bullish and bearish phases. The 
results reveal that the stock market reacts significantly to the analysts’ downgrades in both 
bullish and bearish phases. On the day of release (t = 0), both AARs are significantly nega‑
tive, with the AAR 0 for the bearish phase (− 0.824%) being much lower than that during the 
bullish period (− 0.372%). The negative abnormal returns persist and are significant for at 
least 3 days after the downgrades for both phases. When one compares the CAR plots based 
on MM residuals for both bullish and bearish phases (see Fig. 2), we find that the over‑
all negative price impact is quite similar for both phases as one approaches t = 10. Thus, 
although the event day fall is bigger in bearish periods, the price falls in bullish periods are 
more spread out over the event window. The price adjustment following the downgrades is 
more gradual in the bullish scenario.
5.5.3  Robustness tests based on the Fama & French 3 factor model
To check for robustness, we also estimated AARs using the Fama & French three factor 





















































Fig. 2  Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) using Fama & French (FF) 3 Factor model during the bull‑
ish (03‑09‑2009 ~ 11‑08‑2010) and the bearish (11‑09‑2010 ~ 01‑01‑2012) phases with upgrades and down‑
grades surrounding the release day
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the results are quite consistent with those we have already reported based on MM residuals: 
Upgrade announcements are followed by price increases, while downgrade announcements 
are followed by price falls. For upgrades, the event‑day returns are 0.31% and 0.02% in 
bullish and bearish periods, respectively, and statistically significant at the 5% level in the 
former case. The CAR plots based on the 3‑factor residuals show that, between t =  − 2 and 
t = 10, the overall price increase is around 0.64% in bullish periods and just under 0.5% 
in bearish periods. As was the case with MM residuals, the price adjustments following 
upgrades were slower in bearish periods. Turning to downgrades, the event day returns are 
0.3% and − 0.55%, in bullish and bearish periods, respectively, with only the latter being 
statistically significant. In bullish periods, it would seem that the significant price declines 
came towards the end of the event window.
In bearish periods, the AARs remain negative and significant from AAR 1 to AAR 2, and 
AAR 7 to AAR 8. Overall, when FF residuals are used, the CAR plots for downgrades show 
that the price adjustment over the event window happens with a delay in bullish periods. 
This is again consistent with our findings based on MM residuals. And in bearish periods, 
the price decline for downgrades (i.e., between t − 2 and t = 10) is around − 1.7%. In bullish 
periods, it is just under − 2.4%.7
5.6  Analyst recommendations conditioned on sentiment
We look at the whole period ranging from January 2009 to May 2014 to gauge the prob‑
ability of an upgrade/downgrade/hold recommendation of an analyst on a given stock, con‑
ditional on the investor sentiment that prevailed in the previous quarter.
We apply our conditional binomial probability framework as in equation to get a better 
understanding of the possible influence of the investor sentiment at a given moment to a 
recommendation made by an analyst. We show the expected probability of the joint effect 
between rec and sen E[P(rec|sen)] and the resulting effect on the average stock return r 
from our expected value r × E[P(rec|sen)] . The following table shows the effects of inves‑
tor sentiment (sen), analyst recommendations (rec), and the corresponding average stock 
returns (r) on a quarterly basis. We also show the expected probability of the joint effect 
between rec and sen E[P(rec|sen)] and the resulting effect on the average stock return r 
from our expected value r × E[P(rec|sen)] . We show this including and excluding look‑
ahead bias in Panel A and B, respectively. In Panel C, we use the Welch’s two sample 
t‑test to show how the average E[P(rec|sen)] or r × E[P(rec|sen)] becomes significantly dif‑
ferent between positive and negative sentiments, and with and without look‑ahead bias. 
We express the positive (negative) sentiment including and excluding look‑ahead bias as 
 Positivebias  (Negativebias) and  Positiveno bias(Negativeno bias), respectively. The Cohen’s d 
provides the effect size that, as a rule of thumb, if the absolute value is greater than 0.8 
and closer to 2, the corresponding Welch’s t‑test result between two sample groups is valid 
although the sample size is small. Panel D shows the descriptions of the variables used in 
this table.
7 We also investigated the effect of the Euro zone crisis on Hong Kong stock returns by running an overall 
Fama and French 3‑factor regression for the Hong Kong market, with a Euro zone crisis dummy variable to 
assess the impact of the Euro zone crisis on Hong Kong stock returns. The dummy variable took the value 
of one from October 19, 2009 to January 31, 2012, inclusive (see Ahmad et al. 2013). We found that the 
dummy variable was not economically or statistically significant; the Eurozone crisis reduced Hong Kong 
Stock returns by − 0.000005%.
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We see an emergence of a clear pattern in both panel A and B from Table 8. In general, 
we find that the positive investor sentiment change corresponds with changes of analyst 
recommendations. We find the following stylized results interpreted from Panel A and B 
of Table 8.
5.7  In the presence of look ahead bias
Whilst the probability on average of ending up with an upgrade status (irrespective of start 
status) is very similar whether one was in a positive or a negative sentiment the expected 
return of all corresponding moves is an order of magnitude higher when one starts with a 
positive sentiment as opposed to a negative one.
5.8  When there is no look ahead bias
Both the probability on average of ending up with an upgrade status (irrespective of 
start status) is higher if one was in a positive as opposed to a negative sentiment and the 
expected return of all corresponding moves is an order of magnitude higher when one 
starts with a positive sentiment as opposed to a negative one.
As shown in panel C when one considers the expected returns to the investors, we see 
that the positive sentiment effect tends to dominate the negative one across different types 
of permutations. i.e. In the presence of look ahead bias the differential returns when one 
is in a positive sentiment (as opposed to a negative one) is statistically significant at 1%. 
Furthermore, when one considers the effect between ‘with’ and ‘without’ look ahead bias 
the differential returns when one is in a positive sentiment (as opposed to a negative one) 
is also statistically significant at 1%. We also find that the differential returns between the 
two corresponding positive sentiments with and without look ahead bias also statistically 
significant at 1%. Our results have important implications to capital market investors as 
one could argue that these investors would be more concerned about their expected returns.
These results align with Bagnoli et  al. (2009) and Corredor et  al.’s (2013) arguments 
that the analysts are more heavily affected and biased by positive investor sentiment when 
issuing favorable stock recommendations as we also find the positive investor sentiment 
effect from all types of stock recommendations in Hong Kong financial markets. As we 
also find positive expected stock returns under positive investor sentiment contingent on 
various analyst recommendations consistent with Barber et al. (2001) and Womack (1996). 
Thus, the investor market sentiment is still a critical factor affecting not only the analyst 
recommendations but also the corresponding stock returns in the Hong Kong financial 
markets.
6  Conclusions and implications of the study
This study examines the short‑term price impact of stock recommendations issued by sell‑
side analysts on 26 major constituent stocks of the Hang Seng Index, the market bench‑
mark monitoring daily movement of the largest companies listed on the Hong Kong Stocks 
Exchange. Numerous academic studies show that stock analysts play an important role in 
the stock market in which their recommendations deliver substantial information to the 
investors, resulting in different levels of price impact.
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We analyze the Hong Kong stock market reactions from analysts’ stock recommen‑
dations (1696 upgrades and downgrades, and 504 initiation coverages) and consider the 
ongoing market sentiments. We find that the analysts’ upgrade recommendations result in 
significantly positive market reactions around the announcement day since these deliver 
newly favorable information to the investors. Similarly, we also find significantly negative 
market reactions to analysts’ downgrade recommendations, which shows even larger reac‑
tions in absolute figure compared to the market reactions to analysts’ upgrade recommen‑
dations. Therefore, the investors are more sensitive to losses than to gains consistent with 
prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). On the other hand, the market reac‑
tions to initiation coverage with buy and sell recommendations are insignificant since these 
do not deliver enough information to the market or the market may reflect all this related 
information too quickly, contrary to Branson et  al. (1998) and Irvine (2003). Then we 
assess the short‑term impact of analysts’ recommendations under two bullish and bearish 
market conditions. We find that the investors react more optimistically to upgrade recom‑
mendations during bullish phase but react even more pessimistically to downgrades during 
bearish phase confirming more loss sensitive investors’ behaviors.
We apply the conditional probability framework to the analyst recommendations con‑
ditioned on the investor sentiment and estimate the corresponding expected stock returns. 
Our finding shows that with look ahead bias the differential returns when one is in a posi‑
tive sentiment as opposed to a negative one, is significant, and that the differential returns 
between the two corresponding positive sentiments with and without look ahead bias also 
statistically significant. Our findings have implications to capital market participants as 
they suggest that exploitable trading strategies can be developed for the Hong Kong market 
with the information of the market sentiment in the past.
This study provides evidence in support to the fact that analysts’ recommendation 
upgrades and downgrades deliver permanent and significant information to the Hong Kong 
stock market. However, analysts’ initiation coverages convey little information and bring 
about limited impact to the stock market. In addition, analysts’ upgrades and downgrades 
result in significant price impact to different extents in the bullish and the bearish phases.
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